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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(j). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4), the Utah Supreme Court poured this matter 
over to this Court on May 23,2007. The Utah Supreme Court initially had jurisdiction of this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Cross-Appellants ("Eaglebrook") state the issues and standards of review. 
Issue I: Whether the trial court erred in not awarding a reasonable amount of 
attorney fees to Eaglebrook when the trial court found that attorney fees 
were proper. 
Standards of Review: Whether the non-award of attorneys' fees to Eaglebrook was 
reasonable will be considered under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985,991 (Utah 1988). Eaglebrook preserved this issue in its Response to 
Plaintiffs' Objections to Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, (R. 250), and 
in oral argument on the motion. 
Issue II: Whether Eaglebrook should be awarded reasonable attorney fees 
incurred as a result of PacifiCorp's appeal and Eaglebrook's cross appeal. 
Standard of Review: None. The appellate court shall award just damages for a 
frivolous appeal. Utah R. App. P. 33(a). In addition, Utah Dept of Social Services v. Adams, 
806 P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 1991) states that "[t]he general rule is that when a party who 
received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably 
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incurred on appeal." 
Cross-Appellants ("Eaglebrook") state that any other issues addressed by opposing 
counsel in its Response Brief of Cross-Appellee Pacificorp are not before this court and 
should not be considered in this appeal. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56, Attorney's fees — Award where action or defense in 
bad faith -- Exceptions, 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to 
a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the 
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except 
under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees 
against a party under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action 
before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under 
the provisions of Subsection (1). 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33(a) & (b). Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; 
recovery of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of 
right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal 
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just 
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, 
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order 
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, 
motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted 
by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the 
purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass, 
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cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit 
only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
Utah Dept of Social Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 1991). 
"The general rule is that when a party who received attorney fees below 
prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on 
appeal." (Citations omitted). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The main issue before the lower court was whether PacifiCorp has an easement over 
property owned by Eaglebrook and, if so, its location. For years, PacifiCorp has used a dirt 
road leading to its Winchester Hills' Substation. Subsequently, R.C. Tolman, president of 
Eaglebrook, paved a new road to his house which is located near the substation; R.C. Tolman 
considered this road his private driveway. Once the road was paved, PacifiCorp's vehicles 
began using this paved road as their primary sub-station access; however, Mr. Tolman 
objected to the use of his private driveway and asserts that this is not the intended easement. 
On April 1,2005, PacifiCorp filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, 
a Motion for Temporary and Preliminary Restraining Order and a Supporting Memorandum 
with the intent of forcing R.C. Tolman/Eaglebrook into providing PacifiCorp access to its 
Winchester Hills' Substation over this new paved road. PacifiCorp failed to serve the 
Complaint or Motion for Preliminary Injunction on Eaglebrook Corporation or R.C. Tolman. 
A Hearing was held fourteen days later; however, neither Eaglebrook Corporation or R.C. 
Tolman were notified of this hearing nor aware of the same. As a result, the lower court 
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issued an unopposed Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction against Eaglebrook 
recognizing temporarily an easement which included this paved road. Mr. Tolman later 
received service of the Order on the Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction. It was the 
first actual notice he had of any action against Eaglebrook. 
Thereafter, Eaglebrook demanded that PacifiCorp prove service which it could never 
do. Though PacifiCorp withdrew the Injunction, it did not withdraw the case. It was obvious 
to Eaglebrook that PacifiCorp liked its position of power and continued to put Eaglebrook 
off, dragging the case on and on despite being unwilling to prove service, or for that matter, 
even serve the initiating pleadings on the Defendant. PacifiCorp did not take the simple step 
of withdrawing the case and refiling, but instead persisted in advancing an improperly 
formed case recognizing the significant power it held over Eaglebrook as Eaglebrook could 
not join the case properly. Eaglebrook realized it was not in a fair position to negotiate and 
the case could not be furthered without any service and due process. It was obvious that 
PacifiCorp had all the power under these conditions and continued to seek to keep it that 
way. Without service, Eaglebrook could not answer or even move the court to dismiss. 
Finally, after two years of unnecessary litigation, PacifiCorp's Complaint and Motion 
for Preliminary Injunction was dismissed after it was clear PacifiCorp could not prove 
service and Defendants moved the court to dismiss, despite not yet being officially part of 
the litigation. 
Eaglebrook has asked that a reasonable amount of attorney fees be awarded for the 
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lower court case. Eaglebrook has also asked for an award of attorney fees incurred as a result 
of the Appeal filed by PacifiCorp, given PacifiCorp's continuous abuses of procedure. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On April 1,2005, PacifiCorp filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief, a Motion for Temporary and Preliminary Restraining Order and a Supporting 
Memorandum. (R. 1-28). This Complaint and Motion pertained to an easement which 
allowed PacifiCorp access to its Winchester Hills' Substation. The issue before the court 
was which road PacifiCorp should be allowed to use for access to its Substation. 
2. On April 14,2005, a Hearing was held on PacifiCorp's Motion for Temporary 
and Preliminary Restraining Order. (R. 29). PacifiCorp was present at the hearing. 
Eaglebrook, who had not been served, was not. The Court entered a Temporary Restraining 
Order enjoining and restraining Eaglebrook from blocking the access road. 
3. On August 9,2005, Eaglebrook's president, R.C. Tolman, was only served the 
Temporary Restraining Order; however, there is no proof of service in the court file. (See 
lower court file.) PacifiCorp has never proved timely service of the Complaint. 
4. On February 24, 2006, Eaglebrook requested an award of attorney fees in its 
Petition to Set Aside Preliminary Injunction. (R. 47). 
5. On August 29, 2006, Eaglebrook requested an award of attorney fees in its 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 139-140). 
6. On November 16,2006, Eaglebrook requested an award of attorney fees at the 
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Hearing for its Motion for Summary Judgment, which the court, by its language, changed to 
a Motion to Dismiss. R. 306 at p. 9-10). 
7. On February 12,2007, Eaglebrook requested an award of attorney fees at the 
Hearing for PacifiCorp's Objections to Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R. 307 at p. 19-22). 
8. On December 27,2006, an Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Request for Fees 
and Costs was filed. The total cumulative amount of all attorney fees was $17,358.00 and 
the total amount of costs was $427.97. (R. 221). 
9. On March 22,2007, the lower court signed the Order on Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment, dismissing the case. The lower court's Order stated "an award of 
attorney fees and costs is proper", (R. 280); "[t]his Court has identified those fees and costs 
it deems reasonably related to the improper actions of the Plaintiff and sets forth the total 
amount of those fees and costs awarded below" (R. 280-281); however, the court awarded 
costs but did not place a dollar value to the award of attorney fees. (R. 281). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Awarding a Reasonable Amount 
of Attorney Fees to Eaglebrook Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
PacifiCorp argues the lower court did not intend to award attorney fees; however, the 
lower court's ruling does not support PacifiCorp's argument. The lower court, in reviewing 
the lower court's comments in context, clearly reevaluated its consideration of awarding 
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attorney fees and took the issue under advisement at the last hearing. Thereafter, in the lower 
court's Order, it stated "an award of attorney fees and costs is proper," (R. 280), and stated 
"[t]he Court has identified those fees and costs it deems reasonably related to the improper 
actions of the Plaintiff and set forth the total amount of those fees and costs awarded below." 
(R. 280-281). The lower court did not place a dollar value for attorney fees in the Order; 
instead, it placed a line where the amount of attorney fees awarded should be placed. 
Further, the court did not explain why a reasonable amount of attorney fees was not awarded 
when it was clear that attorney fees were incurred as a result of PacifiCorp's abusive actions 
and inactions. 
PacifiCorp argues the lower court's Order that "an award of attorney fees and costs 
is proper" was error; however, PacifiCorp did not preserve this argument for appeal. 
PacifiCorp did not file a Motion for Reconsideration or preserve this issue on appeal. The 
language of the Order is now the law of the case. The issue before the court is not whether 
attorney fees are proper as PacifiCorp asserts wrongly, but whether the lower court erred or 
abused its discretion by not awarding a reasonable amount of attorney fees. 
PacifiCorp argues the lower court did not find bad faith; however, the lower court's 
ruling supports a general finding of bad faith in stating that an award of attorney fees was 
proper. The finding of bad faith should be considered to the degree that it affects the amount 
of attorney fees to be awarded taking into consideration the abusive and unconscionable 
actions of PacifiCorp. The lower court found that "an award of attorney fees and costs is 
7 
proper" (R. 280); this is the law of the case. One must conclude that the lower court 
determined that PacifiCorp's actions rose to the level of a general finding of bad faith. This 
is uncontested, as PacifiCorp has failed to preserve any right to object to the Order's 
language. PacifiCorp's abusive and unconscionable actions must now be acknowledged. 
The only remaining issue is the reasonable amount of attorney fees that should be awarded 
in this case. 
PacifiCorp argues that if the appeals court determines that a reasonable amount of 
attorney fees should be awarded, then, PacifiCorp suggests a nominal fee. This is not the 
standard. The appeals court should instruct the lower court to consider all of the attorney 
fees that were reasonably incurred as a result of PacifiCorp's abusive and unconscionable 
actions. If the case is remanded, the appeals court should instruct the lower court to take into 
consideration the two years of fees incurred as a result of PacifiCorp's abusive and 
unconscionable actions, which equates to nearly the entirety of fees incurred. 
II. EAGLEBROOK IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER THEIR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
INCURRED ON APPEAL. 
PacifiCorp argues that attorney fees on appeal should only be awarded if the lower 
court awards attorney fees. Eaglebrook should indeed receive attorney fees on appeal if the 
lower court awards attorney fees. In addition, Eaglebrook should also receive attorney fees 
based upon Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33(a) & (b) for the frivolous appeal PacifiCorp 
filed and its subsequent abusive and unconscionable actions on appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
There are two narrow issues before this court. The two issues are: 1) whether the trial 
court erred in not awarding a reasonable amount of attorney fees to Eaglebrook when it found 
that attorney fees were proper; and 2) whether Eaglebrook should be awarded reasonable 
attorney fees incurred as a result of PacifiCorp's appeal and Eaglebrook's cross appeal. 
Any other red herring issues addressed by opposing counsel in its Response Brief Of 
Cross-Appellee are improper and not before this court. These must not be considered in this 
appeal as they have not been adequately preserved. 
Accordingly, Eaglebrook replies to PacifiCorp's Response Brief as follows: 
I. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Awarding a Reasonable 
Amount of Attorney Fees to Eaglebrook Pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 
78-27-56. 
The lower court, in its Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, stated 
that "an award of attorney fees and costs is proper." (R. 280). This is the law of the case. 
The lower court, however, did not make clear as to what amount of attorney's fees was 
reasonable in this case. 
A. PacifiCorp argues the lower court did not intend to award attorney fees; 
however, the lower court's ruling does not support PacifiCorp's 
argument 
Arguing against the clear language of the final Order, PacifiCorp argues in its 
Response Brief of Cross-Appellee that the lower court did not intend to award attorney fees. 
PacifiCorp cited a segment of an oral hearing on February 12,2007, wherein the lower court 
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states, "I believe the court would have not granted attorney fees..." (R. 307 at p. 1); however, 
PacifiCorp fails to provide the appeals court with the subsequent argument presented to the 
court by Eaglebrook and the subsequent comments made by the court. In other words, they 
have quoted a comment made by the court before counsel for Eaglebrook had even made 
substantive arguments. 
To place the court's statements in context, the following is the discussion regarding 
attorney fees that was before the lower court and the court's response: 
Eaglebrook requested the award of attorney fees in its Petition to Set Aside 
Preliminary Injunction accompanying memorandum filed on February 24, 2006. (R. 47). 
Eaglebrook also requested the award of attorney fees in its Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed on August 29, 2006, wherein it noted "Utah Code Annotated, 78-27-56(1), 
states: "In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party 
if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not 
brought or asserted in good faith..." (R. 139-140). 
Eaglebrook requested the award of attorney fees at Eaglebrook's Motion for Summary 
Judgment hearing on November 16, 2006. The judge, in the November 16, 2006 hearing 
regarding the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Motion to Dismiss], noted: 
THE COURT: The court, Mr. Graham, is going to grant the 
motion to dismiss the preliminary injunction. Mr. Graham 
and/or Mr. Rodriguez, if you'll go ahead and prepare an order 
for the court, the court will go ahead and take a look at the 
attorney fees. And F11 go ahead and make a ruling with respect 
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to that. 
MR. GRAHAM: Let me clarify, their complaint is for the 
injunction, so we are dismissing the complaint, if I'm -
THE COURT: That's correct. That's correct. Anymore record, 
Mr. Graham, or, Mr. Rodriguez, that you would like to make at 
this time? 
MR. GRAHAM: Just that we will be submitting attorney fees 
and costs in camera for your review. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much.... 
(R. 306 at p. 9-10). (Emphasis added). 
In response to the dismissal, PacifiCorp filed its Objections to Order on Defendants9 
Motion for Summary Judgment on December 12,2006. (R. 173-176). A hearing was then 
requested. (R. 192). 
On February 12, 2007, the court heard PacifiCorp's Objections to Order on 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. At the hearing, PacifiCorp's counsel brought 
up the issue of attorney fees. The court noted the following: 
THE COURT: Mr. Rampton, frankly with respect to the issue of 
attorney's fees, if you would have appeared on November 16th, 
2005, or someone from your firm would have appeared, I doubt 
very much, in fact, I believe the court would have not granted 
attorney's fees. So, with respect to that issue, I think that's a 
moot issue, because the court's going to set aside the court order 
with respect to attorney's fees at this time. I just don't think I 
would have awarded those at the time. So, I don't think you 
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need to argue that, counsel. 
(R. 307 at p. 13). 
PacifiCorp would have the Appeals Court stop reading at this point. The court, however, has 
the full records and should continue reading. After the court made its comments to Mr. 
Rampton, the court, then, gave Eaglebrook the opportunity to argue its position before the 
court. Eaglebrook argued the following: 
MR. GRAHAM: ... What should have happened is that once 
recognizing they are out of the 120 days, rather than playing 
dodgeball, they should have said, we recognize that this is not 
properly framed. We are going to go ahead and refile this 
matter because there is no prejudice to the parties. Instead, what 
we had is an aggressive position taken by the plaintiffs which 
caused, I might add, attorney fees, a lot of attorneys fees. 
Because when you are playing dodgeball, you have to run 
around a lot. And that's what we were playing. We didn't 
know the rules that Mr. Ramptom was playing by. ... 
(R. 307 at p. 19). (Emphasis added). 
Later, in the February 12, 2007 hearing, Mr. Graham, again, brought up attorney fees. He 
pleaded with the court to award attorney fees as you will note from the Hearing transcript: 
MR. GRAHAM: ... The only thing that I would ask the court 
to reconsider is addressing the attorney fees. Certainly, there 
are things that we will benefit from in the second or subsequent 
action. And, certainly, the court take its own discretion to 
reduce that by things that we would benefit from. But there 
were a lot of things that can not, will not be raised in the second 
action. And those things were caused by the improper 
advancement of this case causing us to be on our heels. Mr. 
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Rodriguez, himself, had to come down to the court and dig 
through the file to find these documents to just get any 
indication as to what was going on in this case. We literally 
have acted in a vacuum, not being able to see or understand 
what was going on. The activity of preparing for hearings that 
we believed were going to summarily resolve the matter under 
the issue of, hey, where is the service, which did not end up 
resulting in that, but certainly were still raised. We still had to 
unwind this case. The preliminary injunction motion was done 
without any appearance on behalf of Mr. Tolman or his 
company. That had to be unwound. The prejudice to the 
defendant is evidenced in the writings themselves in the time 
that is kept. And I would ask the detailed pleadings. We have 
tried to get as detailed as we can. I would ask that the court look 
at that and consider which items were caused by inappropriate 
advancement of this case rather than simply saying on the very 
first motion, Mr. Graham, you are right. In fact, they said that, 
Your Honor, Mr. Graham, you are right. We are outside the 
120. Excuse us. Let me just dismiss this action by stipulation 
or by our own matter because we hadn't answered. They could 
have easily just withdrawn the matter, re filed it appropriately 
for 100 something dollars, then get the thing appropriately set. 
Instead, they pushed and pushed and pushed. And that resulted 
in attorney fees. I would ask the court to reconsider, examine 
those billings if it would and make an award of attorney fees. 
(R. 307 at p. 21-22). (Emphasis added). 
Following Mr. Graham's pleading for attorney fees, the court gave Mr. Rampton the 
opportunity to respond to Mr. Graham's comments. Mr. Rampton made what appears to be 
a referral to attorney fees when he noted: 
MR. RAMPTON:... Never was a motion to dismiss made until 
the motion for summary judgment was filed. Never. And for 
counsel to say that they incurred all of this expense and all of 
this delay, they didn't. We were going forward with the case. 
Everybody was going forward with the case, including the court. 
13 
The court was involved at that point. The court had made an 
order. Counsel had stipulated to be bound by it. 
(R. 307 at p. 24). 
At the conclusion of the February 12, 2007 hearing, the court noted: 
THE COURT: ...I've a pretty good idea how I am going to rule. 
However, there are issue[s] of attorney's fees and the, also the 
whole, well the whole issue with respect to jurisdiction and 
whether or not proper form was followed in this case. ... 
(R. 307 at p. 26). 
Initially, the court may have considered not awarding attorney's fees; however, after 
Mr. Graham had the opportunity to argue his position of the case and argue for attorney fees, 
the court was clearly reconsidering the award of attorney fees at the end of all arguments. 
To represent the record differently is to misrepresent the record. Fortunately, this court is not 
limited to PacifiCorp's edited version of the proceedings. 
Later, the lower court, in its Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed on March 22, 2007, stated that "an award of attorney fees and costs is proper." (R. 
280). The lower court then specifically stated in its Order that "...the Court has identified 
those fees and costs it deems reasonably related to the improper actions of the Plaintiff and 
sets forth the total amount of those fees and costs awarded below" (R. 280-281). The trial 
judge, then, in completing his Order, stated that "[t]his Court orders that an award of 
reasonable attorney fees unnecessarily expended by the Defendants be awarded in the amount 
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of $ and costs of suit unnecessarily expended by the Defendants be awarded in 
the amount of $427.97. The fees and costs shall be paid to the Defendants within thirty days 
of the entry of this order." (R. 281). Despite a clear finding, the lower court failed to specify 
an amount of attorney fees or record the reason for not awarding an amount of reasonable 
attorney fees, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(2)(b), if that was its intent as there was 
no affidavit of impecuniosity filed. It is painfully obvious that Eaglebrook incurred attorney 
fees which were necessary to address PacifiCorp's Complaint & Motion for Injunction filed, 
to address the improper Injunction awarded by the lower court, and to address the dismissal 
of the case. It would be an obvious injustice to Eaglebrook to not award attorney fees in this 
case; therefore, the lower court obviously erred or abused it discretion when it did not award 
a reasonable amount of attorney fees. This action should have never advanced beyond the 
fact of the untimely service. To the extent it did, PacifiCorp is responsible for fees and costs. 
Eaglebrook further argues that if a Court finds that costs should be awarded in an 
amount of $427.97, then, a reasonable amount of attorney fees should also be awarded. With 
a finding that an award of attorney fees and costs is proper and considering the significant 
number of attorney fees that Eaglebrook incurred as a result of PacifiCorp's failure to serve 
its Complaint for Declaratory Injunctive Relief and its Motion for Temporary Restraining 
Order and Preliminary Injunction and its subsequent actions, this court must remand the case 
back to the lower court with instructions to award a reasonable amount of attorney fees to 
Eaglebrook. Eaglebrook suggests the initial request of $17,358.00 plus interest from the 
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original Order date. 
B. PacifiCorp argues the lower court's Order that "an award of attorney fees 
and costs is proper" was error; however, PacifiCorp did not preserve this 
argument for appeal. 
The lower court judge, in his Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgement, 
stated that "an award of attorney fees and costs is proper." (R. 280). 
PacifiCorp had the opportunity to protest the lower court's ruling; however it did not. 
PacifiCorp did not file a Motion for Reconsideration requesting that the lower court review 
it Order on this matter. Furthermore, PacifiCorp did not preserve this argument on appeal. 
Accordingly, the Order is binding on PacifiCorp. As such, whether "an award of 
attorney fees and costs is proper", (R. 280), is not an appealable issue and is not before this 
court. 
C. PacifiCorp argues the lower court did not find bad faith; however, the 
lower court's ruling supports a general finding of bad faith in stating that 
an award of attorney fees was proper. The finding of bad faith should be 
considered to the degree that it affects the amount of attorney fees to be 
awarded taking into consideration the abusive actions of PacifiCorp. 
Following the review of this case and the case law submitted by counsel, the court 
made its final determination. The trial court judge specifically found that "an award of 
attorney fees and costs is proper" (R. 280), in this case. An award of attorney fees is proper 
because of the unconscionable actions of PacifiCorp. PacifiCorp filed its Complaint for 
Declaratory Injunctive Relief and its Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction on April 1, 2005. (R. 1-28). Unfortunately, PacifiCorp dragged the 
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case on and on, delaying the case until it was dismissed on March 22, 2007, after being 
unable to prove service. (R. 277-282). Almost two years of unnecessary litigation transpired. 
As such, it is clear the order was based on the court's finding that "the Plaintiff did not take 
the simple step of withdrawing this case, but persisted in advancing an improperly formed 
case against good reason,... and caused the Defendants to defend in a void of pleadings and 
proper procedure..." (R. 280). While the trial court did not use the specific language "bad 
faith" in its ruling, the court did find that attorney fees and costs were proper in this case. 
(R. 280). The finding to justify such an award is necessarily based on bad faith. 
PacifiCorp's motives are very suspect in this case, as there is absolutely no evidence that 
PacifiCorp even attempted to serve its Complaint for Declaratory Injunctive Relief and its 
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction on Eaglebrook. In 
addition, there is absolutely no evidence that PacifiCorp made an attempt to provide Notice 
to Eaglebrook of the Hearing on the Preliminary Injunction. Eaglebrook also made the court 
aware of unconscionable delays and its persistent requests for PacifiCorp to prove service. 
(R. 307 at p. 14). Eaglebrook explained to the court that PacifiCorp continually wanted to 
press forward with the case without proving service or even making belated service. It was 
further obvious that any attempt to negotiate an agreement between the parties would have 
immediately placed PacifiCorp in an unconscionable advantage over Eaglebrook as long as 
there was an Injunction in place - an Injunction that should have never been awarded 
because the Complaint and Motion upon which the Injunction was based lacked proper 
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service. Taking such facts in its totality, there is basis for the lower court to find bad faith. 
Such facts should be taken into consideration by the lower court when awarding the amount 
of attorney fees. 
The court recognized after review of the facts and case law that the court had the right 
to dismiss the case and award the appropriate attorney fees and costs. The court specifically 
ruled that attorney fees and costs were proper in this case. The question then was what was 
the reasonable amount of attorney fees that should be awarded under these circumstances and 
facts. 
D. PacifiCorp argues that if the appeals court determines that a reasonable 
amount of attorney fees should be awarded, then, PacifiCorp suggests a 
nominal fee; however, the appeals court should instruct the lower court 
to consider all of the attorney fees that were reasonably incurred as a 
result of PacifiCorp's abusive and unconscionable actions. 
Eaglebrook agrees that the appeals court should remand the case back to the lower 
court to make a determination as to the amount of attorney fees to be awarded; however, 
when remanding the case back to the lower court, the appeals court should instruct the lower 
court that a reasonable amount of attorney fees should be awarded taking into consideration 
the two years of fees incurred as a result of PacifiCorp's abusive and unconscionable actions. 
It is Eaglebrook's position that the amount of attorney fees that Eaglebrook should be 
awarded should be determined by the amount of unnecessary work that was done on this 
case, such as, pursuing a Complaint and Motion which lacked process of service, asking the 
Court for an Injunction without due process, the unconscionable and continual delays 
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attributable to PacifiCorp, the misrepresentations of PacifiCorp, and for activity necessary 
to dismiss the case. To be fair, the court should consider all attorney fees incurred starting 
• from April 1,2005, when the first Complaint for Declaratory Injunctive Relief and its Motion 
for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction was filed, (R. 1-28), and 
consider all attorney fees incurred through March 22,2007, when the Complaint was finally 
dismissed and the Injunction set aside. (R. 277-282). In reality, Eaglebrook's position was 
not furthered during that period of time and very little was accomplished regarding the 
easement which was the main issue of the Complaint. (R. 1-28). Eaglebrook received very 
little benefit from the work that was done prior to the dismissal of this case as most of its 
efforts were focused on setting aside the injunction which was awarded without notice and 
without due process and unwinding the damage done to Eaglebrook. Therefore, most if not 
all of the attorney fees incurred from April 1, 2005 through March 22, 2007 should be 
awarded. Eaglebrook suggests the initial request of $17,358.00 plus interest from the 
original Order date. 
II. EAGLEBROOK IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER THEIR ATTORNEY'S 
FEES INCURRED ON APPEAL. 
Eaglebrook is seeking an award of attorney fees incurred on appeal. Eaglebrook is 
requesting an award of attorney fees which Eaglebrook incurred as a result of the appeal filed 
by PacifiCorp. Eaglebrook is also requesting an award of attorney fees on appeal which 
Eaglebrook incurred as a result of the Cross-Appeal filed by Eaglebrook. 
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A. PacifiCorp argues that attorney fees on appeal should only be awarded if 
the lower court awards attorney fees; however, Eaglebrook should not 
only receive attorney fees on appeal if the lower court awards attorney 
fees but Eaglebrook should also receive attorney fees based upon Utah 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 33(a) & (b) for the frivolous appeal 
PacifiCorp filed and its subsequent abusive and unconscionable actions. 
PacifiCorp' s behavior has been frustrating and unconscionable from the beginning and 
to date continues to be evident. It is PacifiCorp who initially filed the appeal; (R. 293-295), 
yet, being consistent with its pattern of abuse of procedure, it failed to meet the deadlines 
required of it in submitting briefs in a timely manner. Even in the instant actions, PacifiCorp 
has even continually requested extension after extension to file its opening brief. Ultimately, 
it did not even meet the required deadline for sustaining its appeal. PacifiCorp's appeal was 
dismissed by this court on September 18, 2007. PacifiCorp claims that it was its 
understanding that a settlement had been reached; however, that was not true. Settlement 
discussions are continuing, but never has a settlement been reached. PacifiCorp's case 
against Eaglebrook is still not resolved. Eaglebrook had necessarily incurred attorney fees 
to protect itself against PacifiCorp's appeal and had filed a cross-claim against PacifiCorp. 
Because of the outrageous behavior of PacifiCorp and the unspeakable amount of wasted 
time and attorney fees expended in this matter, it is appropriate for Eaglebrook to recover its 
losses under Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56, which allows attorney fees to be awarded in 
cases pursued in bad faith. 
In addition, Eaglebrook should be awarded attorney fees if the court remands this case 
back to the lower court and the lower court awards a reasonable amount of attorney fees. 
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This is based upon the case of Utah Dept of Social Services v. Adams ^  806 P.2d 1193 (Utah 
App. 1991), which states that "[t]he general rule is that when a party who received attorney 
fees below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on 
appeal." Though PacifiCorp's appeal had been dismissed because of its failure to submit its 
brief to the appeals court on time, Eaglebrook felt it was important to go forward with its 
counter-appeal requesting the award of reasonable attorney fees as a result of the lower court 
error or abuse of discretion and for the appropriate attorneys fees incurred as a result of the 
appeal. PacifiCorp should be held responsible for its abusive and unconscionable behavior. 
Accordingly, Eaglebrook asks that the appeals court award reasonable attorney fees 
to Eaglebrook for the fees that it incurred as a result of PacifiCorp's Appeal and 
Eaglebrook's Cross-Appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly found that an award of attorney fees and costs was "proper" 
in dismissing PacifiCorp's action; however, the trial court committed patent error or abused 
it discretion by not awarding a reasonable amount of attorney fees to Eaglebrook, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. PacifiCorp's improperly pursued an improperly formed case 
when it knew service was not timely. Therefore, this court should instruct the lower court 
to determine the reasonable amount of attorney fees incurred as a result of PacifiCorp's 
abusive and unconscionable actions which is the subject of this appeal. 
This court should also award to Eaglebrook a reasonable amount of attorney fees and 
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costs which were incurred as a result of PacifiCorp's Appeal and Eaglebrook's Cross-
Appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of February, 2008. 
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By 
Robert C. Graham 
Nevada State Bar No. 4618 
Appearing Pro Hac Vice 
Michele P. Chambers 
Utah State Bar No. 7481 
Attorneys for Appellees/Cross-Appellant 
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